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Leaving Home as a Self-selection Device 
By MOHAMED JELLALt and FRANCOIS-CHARLES WOLFFt 
t ESC Toulouse, and GRID, ENSAM/ESTP I LEN-CEBS, UniversitW deNantes; CNA V and INED, Paris 
Final version received 14 February 2002. 
We develop a model of intergenerational co-residence and transfers within the family in a 
setting of asymmetric information. Following an exchange motive, altruistic parents receive 
services from their children, who may make them financial gifts in return. However, parents 
do not know the privacy cost to children of home-sharing. Hence they make additional 
transfers in order to discipline their children and give them incentives to reveal their true 
privacy cost. We show that only children who stay at the parental home receive an 
informational rent, and that this rent is greater for recipients with a low privacy cost. 
INTRODUCTION 
Intergenerational transfers of income within the family are of central 
importance in understanding patterns of aggregate capital accumulation 
and wealth inequality. Whereas a few years ago economic research was 
especially interested in bequest behaviour, it is now well acknowledged that 
the bulk of private transfers between the generations occurs inter vivos. An 
illustration is given by the controversy between Kotlikoff and Summers 
(1981), who claim that almost 80% of the US wealth accumulation would be 
due to intergenerational transfers, and Modigliani (1988), according to whom 
life-cycle accumulation accounts for the main share of wealth. A feature of 
this unsettled debate concerns the motives for private transfers within the 
family, an issue that has strong implications for the effectiveness of public 
policies. 
The numerous factors that are able to explain the discrepancy between 
these measures of inherited wealth have been put in a prominent position by 
Blinder (1988) and Kessler and Masson (1989). A significant effect relates to 
the definition of private intergenerational transfers included in the analysis. 
Indeed, the results that are in favour of the life-cycle hypothesis take account 
only of bequests and large financial transfers; hence the measure of the share 
of inherited wealth largely neglects the weight of the other types of inter vivos 
solidarities. Intergenerational transfers are however an important resource 
for various family members, since they may affect a variety of behaviours 
within the family, such as labour supply or geographic location.' Three types 
of inter vivos assistance can be seen to exist: financial gifts, time-related 
services (provision of contact and services, care to the elderly), and co- 
residence. 
To date, the numerous theoretical and empirical studies that have 
attempted to infer the motives behind private transfers have focused 
especially on transfers in the form of money and to a lesser extent on non- 
market services and attention (see Laferrbre 1999). Conversely, the question 
of the motives for co-residence between parents and their children has been 
largely neglected by economists, with a few exceptions (Ermisch 1996; 
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Ermisch and Di Salvo 1997; McElroy 1985; Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993). A 
plausible explanation for this neglect is related to the difficulties in evaluating 
shared-housing arrangements compared with financial gifts, as it often seems 
problematical to separate the donor from the recipient of the housing 
transfer. In any case, it is unclear which generation benefits from co- 
residence, the parents or the children. Moreover, these arrangements are 
more likely to involve other types of transfer in the same or in the reverse 
direction, in the form of either money or services. 
Therefore, the possibility of strong substitutions among the various 
transfer currencies suggests that home-sharing differs from the provision of 
non co-resident financial gifts and services. As claimed by Rosenzweig and 
Wolpin (1993), the provision of private assistance in the form of co-residence is 
characterized by the two following properties. 
1. Because of the (quasi-) public good nature of housing services, co-residence 
is a cheaper mechanism for parents to transfer resources to their children 
than paying for another independent home. 
2. Home-sharing entails a cost to the generations in terms of privacy, each 
generation having a strong preference to live in an independent home. 
Two motives for financial transfers from parents to children need to be 
distinguished. On the one hand, altruistic transfers are explained by the donor's 
concern for the well-being of the recipient (Becker 1991), and generations 
perfectly pool their resources when transfers are strictly positive. On the other 
hand, the donor may be motivated by an exchange whereby services are 
expected in return for the financial gifts bestowed, so that the transfer amount 
can rise with the children's income when the demand of time-related resources 
by the parents is inelastic (Cox 1987). Children may also be induced to enter a 
system of familial loans when their borrowing on the credit market is 
constrained.2 
As we consider housing transfers in the form of co-residence, the few 
models that have been proposed in the economic literature focus mainly on 
altruistic feelings within the family. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993, 1994) set 
out an overlapping-generations model where benevolent parents engage in a 
non-cooperative game with their children. In a static framework, Dunn and 
Phillips (1998), Ermisch and Di Salvo (1997) and Wolff (1999) extend the 
standard altruistic model by including co-residence which corresponds to a 
pure public good for households, non-housing consumption being a private 
good.3 Finally, Ermisch (1996) considers a two-period model where parents 
decide on the level of financial and housing transfers conditional on the human 
capital investment decisions of their children, motives for transfers being 
relevant either from altruism or from exchange. 
Recently, a few papers have attempted to relax the prevalent assumption of 
perfect information in models of private intergenerational transfers. In a 
setting of asymmetric information, Chami (1996, 1998) proves that an 
observability problem gives rise to a serious moral hazard problem, such that 
financial transfers are hence state-contingent.4 The argument that parents are 
unable to observe perfectly the amount of effort provided by children also 
explains why altruistic parents have a strong preference for late bequests rather 
than early financial inter vivos transfers (Cremer and Pestieau 1996, 1998). 
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While inter vivos gifts occur prior to the realization of children's earnings, 
bequests are conversely conditioned on the children's realized income and 
hence provide incentives for the children to reveal their true ability. Using a 
model of altruism with endogenous labour supply, Fernandes (2000) proves 
that the redistributive neutrality property associated with altruistic feelings 
from parents does not hold when the work effort of children is privately 
observed. Finally, Cigno et al. (2000) examine the relationship between 
government and families in an imperfect information setting. 
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we develop a model of 
intergenerational transfers that encompasses the three currencies of inter vivos 
solidarities: money, services and co-residence. Second, drawing on the most 
recent developments in the economics of the family, we assume asymmetric 
information between the parents and their children and consider that parents 
are not perfectly informed about the privacy cost to the offspring entailed by 
the home-sharing arrangements. Our aim is to get a better understanding of 
how the pattern of co-residence varies with the characteristics of children. In an 
altruistic model, it is expected that poorer children are more likely to live with 
their parents (Dunn and Phillips 1998; Ermisch 1996; Wolff 1999). The 
assumption of asymmetric information allows us to offer a different 
explanation for this prediction, relevant from a self-interest perspective rather 
than from altruistic feelings. Parents are induced to make transfers in order to 
discipline children and provide them with incentives to reveal their true privacy 
cost. Hence we prove that only the children who decide to stay at the parental 
home have the advantage of an informational rent, and that the rent is greater 
for those recipients characterized by a low privacy cost. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section I outlines a 
basic model of intergenerational transfers along with the notation. It includes 
the possibility of financial gifts, services and co-residence between parents and 
children. The full information solution is briefly discussed. In Section II, we 
assume that the children's cost of privacy involved by the home-sharing 
arrangement is privately known. Hence, following the theory of incentives 
contracting, the compensation structure that induces a truthful revelation leads 
to an informational rent that is derived only by co-resident children. In 
Section III, we study in greater detail the optimal solutions of the transfers 
currencies. Concluding comments are presented in Section IV. 
I. A MODEL OF PRIVATE TRANSFERS 
In this section we examine a theoretical static model of private transfers that 
accounts for three transfer currencies. We consider a family consisting of two 
generations, each being represented by only one individual. The parent and the 
child are, respectively, denoted by subscripts p and k. 
Following Becker (1991), we make the assumption that the parent is 
altruistic. Hence he cares about the well-being of his child. The parental utility 
also depends on his non-housing private consumption, Cp, and his consump- 
tion of housing, H,. Because of altruistic feelings, the parent can enhance the 
child's level of satisfaction by making a cash transfer T (T > 0). In return, the 
child provides upstream services S in the form of contact and attention, as 
described in Cox (1987) and Cox and Rank (1992).5 While the parent enjoys an 
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increase in services, the child suffers from a disutility in helping the parent. The 
child's level of satisfaction also depends on his private consumption Ck and 
housing consumption Hk. A final transfer concerns the residence state. Let h be 
a parameter that indicates whether the parent and child live in independent 
homes (h = i) or co-reside (h = c). It is important to note that the various types 
of consumption, as well as the time-related and financial transfers, are 
conditioned by this choice of h. 
So the parent maximizes the following utility function Uh: 
(1) Uh = U(Cp, Hp, Sh, Vh(Ck, Hk, Sh, Ih)), h = i, c, 
where Vh is the level of satisfaction for the child conditional on his location 
choice and Oh indicates the privacy cost for the child who resides at the parental 
home such that Oc = 0, but 0i = 0. The model has the following structure (see 
Ermisch and Di Salvo 1997). The parent chooses his private and public 
consumptions as well as financial transfers in order to maximize his own 
satisfaction. Then, the child takes as given the parental transfers rules and she 
decides on the residence state and on her private and public consumptions so as 
to maximize her own utility. 
In this model, the definition of the budget constraints depends on the co- 
residence status. We assume that each agent is endowed with a fixed amount of 
income, Y, and Yk. While Y, does not depend on h, the levels of income Yk 
and Yi are likely to be different. Indeed, leaving the parental home is 
associated with greater job opportunities. Rather than having a low income Yck 
under co-residence, a mobile child may more likely find a job with a higher 
wage. Job search associated with mobility is an effective mechanism to benefit 
from high returns of human capital investment, and thus the inequality 
Y1 > Yc holds. Another interpretation deals with the following sequential 
decision. First, the child lives with the parent and receives Yc. Then, an 
attractive job opportunity is proposed to the child, who has to decide whether 
she will coreside or choose an independent home and receive a higher income. 
Let us examine the two cases for h. When the child lives away from the 
parent (h = i), the constraints are: 
(2) Cp + Hp = Y - T'i, 
(3) Ck + Hk = Yi + Ti. 
The two constraints collapse to C, + Hp + Ck + Hk = Yp + Yk when TV > 0. 
When the two generations co-reside in the parental home (h = c), the 
constraints are different: 
(4) Cp + H = Yp - Tc, 
(5) Ck=- + TC 
The modification in the latter case is related to the public good nature of the 
housing consumption Hp.6 The child may devote all her income to her private 
consumption as she derives satisfaction from the parental housing consump- 
tion Hp, but in return she will suffer from a privacy cost 0. 
Using this simple model, we can easily predict how the characteristics of 
both the parent and the child affect the likelihood of financial and time 
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transfers as well as co-residence.7 For example, the probability of observing a 
home-sharing arrangement decreases when the child is characterized by a high 
value of privacy cost. A same result is expected when the utility of extra 
consumption or extra housing is low, which is more likely for a high income 
child. Because of the altruistic motive in this model, it is expected that the 
parent will devote a greater amount of resources in the form of gifts and/or co- 
residence when the recipient child is in a poor financial situation. 
II. CO-RESIDENCE UNDER UNOBSERVABLE PRIVACY COST 
We now extend the previous model by relaxing the perfect observability within 
the family. We assume that the parent does not perfectly know the value of the 
child's privacy cost 0 entailed by the home-sharing arrangement. In this setting, 
we use the theory of incentives contracting to prove that a co-resident child 
benefits from an informational rent given by the parent. As usual in the theory 
of cost-reimbursement rules (Laffont and Tirole 1993), we are induced to 
restrict our analysis to the case of linear and separable utility functions, 0 being 
an additive privacy cost. Hence the utility function Uh of the parent 
conditional on the residence state (h = i, h = c) takes the two following values: 
(6) Ui = (Yp - Hp - Ti) + (Si) + ip(Y + Ti - 4(Si) - Hk), 
(7) Uc = (Yp - Hp - Tc) + O(Sc) + op(Y C + Tc - O(Sc) - 0) 
where p/ (0 < o, < 1) is the altruistic weight attached by the parent to the child's 
level of satisfaction, q(Sh) is a function that indicates the parental utility from 
receiving the child's services with 0' > 0 and /" < 0, and O(Sh) is the loss of 
well-being suffered from the child when providing services, where V)'> 0, 
V)" > 0 and 4'(0) = 0. 
We make the restrictive assumption that the cost of the child's services does 
not depend on the child's location and enters additively in the objective 
function.8 This avoids any effects between the family contract and the rental 
agreement, so that the services contractual relationship does not suffer from 
any information asymmetry and an efficient exchange can be implemented. 
However, it is necessary to account for services in our model because of the 
underlying exchange motive: a parent receives services from her child in 
exchange for financial transfers and possibly co-residence. 
The child's desire for privacy entails the cost 0 only in the case of co- 
residence. This privacy cost parameter 0, which is known privately to the child, 
is supposed to be a continuous parameter that belongs to the closed interval 
Q = [0, 0], where 0 > 0. The parameter 0 is modelled as the realization of a 
random variable with distribution F(O) and corresponding density Jf() > 0 on 
Q. We make the following assumption on F, which may be seen as a decreasing 
returns assumption:9 
Assumption 1. Monotone hazard rate of F: 
(d F(9) 
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The structure of moves in the model is given by the following sequence. 
(i) The privacy cost 0 is revealed to the child only. 
(ii) The parent proposes a complete contract to the child. 
(iii) The child accepts or rejects the contract. 
(iv) The payoffs for both familial players are determined. 
In this setting, the parent's problem is to design a compensation structure 
that maximizes his expected utility while guarantying the child at least his 
reservation utility. We define the child's reservation utility as the level of 
satisfaction that she will obtain if she refuses all future contact with her 
parents.10 In that case, the child chooses independent residence. Clearly, this 
level of utility is given by Yk - Hk. This reservation payoff means that no 
transfers are expected when the child does not accept the contract. 
From the literature on incentive contracting and the revelation principle 
(Laffont and Tirole 1993), it is well known that, without loss of generality, one 
can restrict the search to the class of mechanisms that induce a truthful 
revelation of the child's privacy cost parameter 0. In the context of our model, 
any optimal mechanism M that induces a truthful reporting can be represented 
as the following allocation:" 
Me = (TC, Ti, qo) 
where qo is the probability that the child leaves the parental home for an 
independent housing, Ti is the financial compensation to be made by the 
parent to the child as a function of the report of 0 when independence is 
chosen, and Tc has a similar interpretation when a co-residence contract is 
implemented. 
Considering a mechanism MO, let Rd, , be the net level of satisfaction that is 
achieved by the child of type 0 if she reports the type 0, given her reservation 
payoff Yi - Hk. Hence Rd, 
may be expressed as (VO, 0 E 9 ): 
(8) Rd, = (1 - qd)[ YC + T - (Sc) - 9] + q[ Y + To - (Si) 
- Hk] - (rK - Hk). 
Thus, the net rent Rd, 0 is: 
(9) R, 0 = (1 - qd)[ Yk - Yk + To - O (Sc)+ Hk - O] 
+ qd[T - -(Si)] 
We note Ro = Ro, 0, the situation where the child's utility is truthfully reported. 
The requirement of truthful reporting gives us the incentive compatibility 
constraint (IC): 
(10) Ro, > 
R4,o VO, 
0 E V . 
Moreover, imposing the condition of individual rationality (IR), we have 
(11) Ro, V > 0 VO E . 
In this setting, the parent's problem is given by the maximization of his 
expected linear utility under the incentive compatibility and the individual 
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rationality constraints: 
max {(1 - qo)[Yp - H, - Tc + 4O(Sc)] + qo[Yp - Hp - T' + q(S')] S, T, qJ0 
+ fpRo} dF(0) 
s.t. Ro 
>R-,o 
Vo,0E Q (IC) 
Ro > 0 V0 E Q (IR) 
We are now able to solve this model of intergenerational transfers with 
asymmetric information between the generations. To find the optimal solutions 
of the various transfer currencies, we begin by characterizing the class of 
familial contracts that satisfies the incentive constraints in order to implement 
Me in a dominant strategy. 
Proposition 1. The contract Mo satisfies the incentive constraints if and only if 
(i) Ro = J' (1 - q(x)) dx, 
(ii) q I> 0 V0 E . 
Proof. From the definition of Ro such that 
Ro = max {(1 - qg)[Yck - Y + T - (Sc) + Hk - 9]+ q[ TT - (S')]}, 
Re is an upper envelope of a linear function in 0; then it is convex, and we have 
almost everywhere using the envelope theorem (V0 E Q),12 
R' = 
-(1 - qo) < 0, 
R~ = q'> 0. 
Now, by integration of R' such that R- 
= 0, we obtain 
Ro = 
J0 
(1- q(x)) dx, 
which corresponds to the informational rent left to the child by the parent. [ 
Because of asymmetric information about the child's privacy cost 
parameter, the parent is forced to give up a costly rent to the child in the 
case of a home-sharing arrangement. This informational rent is used to 
discipline the child into revealing her true cost of privacy entailed by the 
coresidence. 
Proposition 1 gives us two additional pieces of information about the 
location choice and the subsequent informational rent. On the one hand, we 
remark that the rent Ro from the parent is a decreasing function of the privacy 
cost parameter 0. Hence, to be willing to reveal her true type, this result means 
that the lower 0-type of child must be rewarded with a more important rent 
value than the higher 0-type. On the other hand, from the monotonicity 
condition such that q, > 0, this implies that a child with a low privacy cost 0 is 
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characterized by an increased probability of staying at the parental home in 
order to extract informational rent. Indeed, Ro is a decreasing function in the 
probability qo of moving away from the parental home. 
In this model of intergenerational transfers, therefore, the introduction of 
asymmetric information between parent and child allows us to suggest a more 
subtle explanation for why a child in a poor financial situation is more likely to 
stay at the parental home. Rather than relying on a pure altruistic explanation, 
whereby the parent provides a greater amount of help to the less well-off child, 
the model conversely argues in favour of a self-interested motivation, where a 
child with a low privacy cost is able to extract a greater informational rent. 
This sets up a strong incentive for a child to behave as if she were forced to live 
with the parent.13 We now examine in greater detail the optimal solutions for 
the three transfer currencies. 
III. THE PATTERN OF INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSFERS 
To find the components Th and qo (h = i, c) of the optimal implemented 
contract Me, we have to determine the expected utility function of the parent. 
We begin by calculation of the expected financial transfer To that depends on 
the two residence states, which may be expressed as 
To = (1 - qo)T ++qeT . 
From the definition of Ro, we arrive at the following expected compensation: 
(12) To = Ro + (1 - qo)[Y' - YC + P(Sc) + 0 - Hk] + qo[(Si)] 
Now, we can insert this previous expected financial gift into the expected utility 
of the parent, which accordingly becomes 
U= {(1 - qo)[Yc - Y'k + Hk - 0 + O(Sc) - (Sc)] 
+ qo[4(Si) - V/(Si)] + (Y, - H,) - (1 - fP)Ro} dF(0). 
From Proposition 1, we know that the information rent Ro received by the co- 
resident child is defined by Ro = fo (1 - q(x)) dx. Hence, by integrating by 










(Y, - Hp)- (1 - p) (1 - qo) dF(). 
In our framework, the location decision does not affect the provision of 
services by children, and the characterization of the optimal family contract is 
only a function of the probability of home-sharing (see Proposition 1). Thus, 
the parent expects a fixed amount of attention conditional on the compensa- 
tions that he offers to her child. 
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So, the parent and the child implement an efficient exchange. Since the 
contracted services cannot be used to induce type-revelation, there is no reason 
to distort the level of attention from its first-best level. The first-order 
conditions for the expected utility (13) are OU/OSc = q'(Sc) - 0'(Sc) = 0 and 
OU/aSi = 0'(Si) - 4)'(Si) = 0. The value of the child's services is chosen such 
that the parental marginal utility of attention is equalized with the child's 
marginal disutility of the provision for upstream services.14 Hence, the level of 
attention is the same whatever the residence state, and we have Si = S- = S*. 
Conversely, the optimal amounts of financial transfers depend on the child's 
location choice. 
Proposition 2. The optimal residence choice is defined by the following 
condition: 
q= 
0 if 0<.0, 
1 if 90>09, 
where 0 is such that 
F(o) 
(1 -p) + , = Yc - Y + 
Hk. f(0) k 
Proof. Since S~ = Si = S*, we obtain the following derivative from (13): 
89U F(O) 
= (1 - p) - +O- + - Hk - . 8qo f(0) 
Define 0 as that value for which 
-U/0qo = 0: 
F(O) (1 - ) + 0 = Yc - Y + Hk. 
Then, Assumption 1 implies that, for 0 > 0, (1 - 3p)F(O)/Jf() + 0 > (1 - 
3p)F(O)/f() )+9, such that dU/8qo >0. Thus, the optimal probability of 
leaving the parental home (denoted by q*) is equal to 1. The opposite holds 
true for 0 < 9, meaning that the probability of living away from the parental 
home is null when 0 < 0. O 
Let us give an interpretation for the condition (1 - 3p)(F(0)/Jf()) + 0= 
Y(k- Yk + Hk. We know that the parent receives the same level of services from the two types of child (co-resident or non co-resident). Hence, it is in the 
parent's interest to buy the services at a low cost, so that the problem is 
min[E9(To)]. However, the altruistic parent takes into account the informa- 
tional rent left to the co-resident child, so that he maximizes 
max[Eo(!pRo)] = / ,n [1 - q(O)]F(9)/f(O) dO. Thus, the optimal level 9 is defined by O[/PE(Ro) - E(To)]/&q(9)= O. At the equilibrium, the marginal 
value of the rent is equalized with the marginal cost of the financial transfer. 
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We now study the various factors that affect the location choice of the 
child. Let LO be the function defined by LO = (1 - ,3)F(O)/ft(O)+ 0 with L' > 0, 
so that the threshold value for the privacy cost 0 is given by 
o = L-'(Y1 - Yi + Hk). The implications of the model are as follows. The 
higher the child's level of income when staying at the parental home, the less 
likely the child is to move away from her parent.15 Conversely, a higher level of 
income associated with greater job opportunities in the case of mobility 
diminishes the occurrence of co-residence (d0/d Y < 0). With poor job market 
propositions, co-residence is more likely. The location choice also depends on 
the housing consumption, as shown by the positive sign of dO/dHk. The child 
prefers to live at the parental home when the housing cost for an independent 
home is too expensive. Finally, the more the parent exhibits altruistic concerns 
towards the child, the more likely the child is to accept the home-sharing 
arrangement. Indeed, an important value for the caring parameter 
,P 
represents a situation where the parent is prepared to give up informational 
rent to the child. 
It is now possible to draw a more complete description of the residence 
choice. From the self-selection process involved by the underlying contract of 
family transfers, we note that only the child who stays at the parental home 
may benefit from the informational rent subsequent to asymmetric informa- 
tion. The following corollary indicates the direction in which the distortion 
goes. 
Corollary 1. The assumption of asymmetric information leads to an increased 
probability that the child chooses independent residence. 
Proof. Under asymmetric information, the threshold value 0 for which the 
child is indifferent between living outside or in the parental home is such that 
S= Hk + Y' - Y - (1 - p)F(O)/f(O). Under symmetric information, the 
informational rent is equal to zero and the parent maximizes his expected 
utility U: 
max U= Yp- Hp + qo[ (S9) - ?(S1)] + (1 - qo)[ Yk 
-- 
Y + Hk - 
S, q 
+ c(SC) - b(S)]. 
Thus, we obtain 
= -Hk + + Y - YC < (>)O < (>)O* = Hk + yk- Yi 
Oqo 
By comparing 0* and 0, we deduce that 0* > 0. The probability of independent 
residence is Pr( 0*) = 1 
-F(0*) under symmetric information and 
Pr(9 > 0) = 1 - F(6) under asymmetric information. Since 0"* > 6, we arrive at 
the result that Pr(9 > 0") < Pr(9 > ) []- 
Corollary 2. The information rent Ro is given by 
Ro = - VO 
.. 
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Proof. From Proposition 1,the rent Ro is Ro = f (1 - q(x)) dx. Hence we 
can write 
RO=J (1 -q(x)) dx+ i(1 -q(x)) dx. 
But from Proposition 2, the probability of moving away from the parental 
home is such that q(x)= 0 when the condition 09 0 is satisfied and q(x) = 1 if 
0 > 9, so that the rent becomes 
Ro = J dx. 
This clearly gives the optimal solution defined by Ro = 0 - 9. O 
In this model, the assumption of asymmetric information forces the parent 
to give up a costly rent to the child who decides to live with his parent. Hence, 
there is a strategic incentive for the offspring not to move away in order to take 
advantage of the parental generosity. Besides, the informational rent is higher 
when the child is characterized by a low privacy cost. To solve the various 
choices of intergenerational transfers, we finally calculate the optimal values 
for the financial gifts conditional on the residence state. 
Proposition 3. The optimal values for the parental financial gifts are 
TC* = (S*) + 0 - Hk + Yi - Y•, k k, 
T=* = (S*). 
Proof. Using (12), we calculate the following optimal value for the 
financial gift in the case of co-residence, since qo = 0 and Ro = 0 - 8: 
T* = (O(S*) + 0 - Hk + Y• - Y) + (0- 0). 
Hence the result is that T** = ?/(S*) + 9 - Hk + Y' - 
Y,. 
But, as we consider 
a child who does not live at the parental home, her privacy cost satisfies the 
condition 09> 0, so that she does not benefit from any informational rent 
(qo = 1, Ro = 0) and T* = (S*). El 
The main implication is that the financial transfer bestowed by the parent 
does not depend on the true value 0 of the child's privacy cost. When the parent 
and the child live apart, the condition Ti* = p(S*) means that the gift value is 
equalized with the compensation entailed by upstream services. Under co- 
residence, we can write TC* + Yc = 0p(S*) + 9 + (0 - 9) + ( Yk - Hk). Now, the 
child's full income is equalized with the sum of the attention cost, the privacy 
cost 9, the gain resulting from informational rent (9 - 9), and the reservation 
payoff. 
Corollary 3. Co-residence decreases the amount of financial transfer received 
by a child. 
? The London School of Economics and Political Science 2003 
434 ECONOMICA [AUGUST 
Proof. From the definition of 0, we have -Hk+ Y - Y= 
-O- 
(1 - 3p)F(O)/f(O). The optimal amount TI* is T * = 
-(S*) 
+ 0 - Hk + 
Y•- 
Yc and hence we get T = (S*) - (1 - )F(3)/f(O). 
Since 
To= I(S*), the equality T *= T- (1- 3p)F(0)/f(0) holds, which proves 
that T* < T*. D 
Finally, we examine the various factors that affect the amount of financial 
transfers at the equilibrium. As found in exchange models without home- 
sharing, the gift value is expected to increase with a rise of upstream services 
whatever the state residence, since dTh/dS* = '(S*) = 0'(S*)> 0 (h = i, c). 
Under co-residence, the gift is a decreasing function of the child's income.16 
Indeed, we have sgn dT**/d Yc = sgn(dO/d Y~ - 1). From the definition of 0, 
we calculate the derivative d0/d Yc, which is given by 
dO 1 
d Yi d F( ) 
1+(1 -)3p) - 
fA 
dO f(9) 
Provided that 3p E [0; 1], and given Assumption 1, it is easy to note that 
dO/d Yc < 1 and hence dTc*/d Yc < 0. The optimal transfer is also an increasing 
function of the independent child's level of income Y1. However, when the two 
generations live apart, the gift value is not affected by a change in the child's 
income and dT*I/dYi =dTi*/dYC =0. The housing value Hk does not 
influence the parental transfer under independent residence (dTi*/dHk = 0), 
but it exerts a negative effect on the gift value when the parent and child live in 
the same home. The child is expected to receive a higher amount when she is 
characterized by an important reservation payoff. Finally, the degree of 
altruism3p ,does not modify the gift value Ti*, but it does exert a positive effect 
on Tc*, since an altruistic parent is more likely to give informational rent to his 
child ((&TC*/00)(a//lp) > 0). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have stressed the role of private information in family 
resource allocation. We propose a model of intergenerational transfers in 
the currencies of money, time and co-residence between a parent and a child 
in a setting of asymmetric information. Using the theory of incentives 
contracting, we show that a child who decides to co-reside receives 
informational rent from the parent: this occurs because the child has 
private information about her privacy cost entailed by the home-sharing. A 
full characterization of the familial choices of transfers is then provided. 
Following the implemented exchange contract, the informational rent is 
greater for the co-resident child who has a low privacy cost. Hence leaving 
the parental home may be seen as a self-selection device. The child 
effectively benefits from informational rent, provided that she does not 
move away from her parent, which requires that her privacy cost does not 
exceed a given threshold. 
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A question worth addressing is that of the relevancy of our model 
regarding empirical evidence. The framework that we have developed in this 
paper seems especially difficult to test. Indeed, in most data-sets, we do not find 
information concerning the three currencies of intergenerational solidarities, 
co-residence, gifts and services. Besides, questions related to both time and 
money transfers are usually put only to parents with non co-resident children; 
implicitly, it is assumed that parents make regular gifts and receive frequent 
services from co-resident children. The relevance of asymmetric information 
could be estimated by observing children's residence decisions and parental 
transfer responses targeted at exogenous events, such as income losses resulting 
from involuntary unemployment or disability, suggesting the use of a panel 
data-set. To the best of our knowledge, there do not exist appropriate data to 
test our model, and further evidence is needed to understand home-sharing 
arrangements. 
Recently, some studies have argued that imperfect information accounts 
for many of the patterns of financial intergenerational transfers. Since the 
neutrality property of the altruism model does not hold (Altonji et al. 1997; 
Wolff 2000), some authors have focused on private information in the context 
of family transfers.17 In that case, the need to convey incentives to the child 
causes the redistributive neutrality to break down. Fernandes (2000) finds that 
the magnitude of the asymmetric information correction factor is substantial 
when assessing the validity of the redistributive neutrality test. Villanueva 
(2001) shows that, in the household of a married child, the probability of 
receiving money responds more to the income of the primary earner than to the 
income of the secondary earner. Determining whether the assumption of 
asymmetric information may also be relevant for family residence decisions is 
an important question left for future research. 
Rather than relying on altruism, our model assumes that co-residence is 
part of an intergenerational exchange within the family, a motive for which 
there exists empirical support. As noted by Attias-Donfut and Rozenkier 
(1996), the situation of cohabitation corresponds to one of mutuality, where 
private assistance must be seen in the context of relations established since 
childhood. When they become adult, children may stay at the parental home 
and receive additional financial aid and other support, which helps them to 
climb the social ladder; but in return they have later to care for aged parents 
who gain the ongoing presence and time-related assistance of their progeny. 
Children repay their debt through this intertemporal exchange. The co- 
residence choice may also convey another benefit: from the material viewpoint, 
co-resident children often get donations of the parental house (Dunn and 
Phillips 1998).18 
A final comment concerns the role of intergenerational transfers in the 
ability of parents to influence the behaviour of their children. Hao et al. (2000) 
present a model of family reputation formation, where parents make a strategic 
use of their transfers in an attempt to prevent their children's undesirable 
actions.19 In our own perspective of intergenerational exchange within the 
family, home-sharing and financial transfers from parents may, conversely, be 
seen as a positive rather than negative sanctioning to supervise the children's 
behaviour, by promoting a model of mutual assistance that takes the form of a 
cyclical exchange of gifts throughout the life course. 
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NOTES 
1. For example, Konrad et al. (2003) show that altruistic children have a strategic incentive to 
move away from their parents when they have siblings. By their own location choice, children 
are able to shift some of the burden of taking care of their elderly parents on to their siblings. 
2. Other forms of exchange models are the strategic bequest transfers from Bernheim et al. (1985), 
where parents get a greater amount of the children's attention by threatening to disinherit 
them, and the intertemporal exchange in the presence of credit market imperfections, where 
gifts to children are a way of saving for old-age support (Cigno 1993). 
3. Financial transfers are greater when the parents and the children live apart than when they are 
co-residing. There exists an intermediate range where the parents make no transfers during co- 
residence, but give money when the children live in an independent home (Ermisch and Di 
Salvo 1997; Wolff 1999). 
4. Labour market conditions exert an influence on the type and level of transfers given by the 
parents (Chami 1998). For example, in the case of a precommitment, altruistic parents are more 
likely to use a state-contingent sharing rule than a fixed transfer rule. 
5. In this familial exchange, these services correspond to care in old-age and companionship, and 
they are supposed to be without close market substitutes (Cox 1987, 1996). 
6. The assumption according to which housing is a pure public good generates a trade-off 
between the cost saving from co-residence and the cost of privacy involved in co-residence. 
While housing is certainly not a pure public good, there may be some cost savings and this 
leads to qualitatively similar results. 
7. The various predictions related to the financial and home-sharing transfers in this static 
altruistic setting are examined in greater detail by Ermisch and Di Salvo (1997) and Wolff 
(1999). 
8. To account for the positive relationship between cost of services and the child's location, one 
can consider that a child living outside suffers from an additional cost D arising from the 
distance travelled when visiting parents. This does not change the main conclusions of our 
analysis, since it just implies that a non co-resident child has a net level of income Y1 - D. 
9. The monotone hazard rate of F is a condition that is satisfied by the most standard 
distributions, i.e. uniform, normal, logistic, exponential or chi-squared (Laffont and Tirole 
1993, p. 66). 
10. We are indebted to the referees for their suggestions concerning the specification of the 
individual rationality constraint. 
11. The variables that depend on the value of the privacy cost 0 are given the subscript 0. 
12. To prove this proposition, we can also follow the approach of Laffont and Tirole (1993). 
Nevertheless, the proof is now standard, so that we prefer to give a shorter one. 
13. In this paper we restrict our attention to the case of complete contracts between parents and 
their children. On the one hand, from an historical perspective, numerous tudies have shown 
that, in the context of family exchanges, parents were signing official contracts with their 
children for a provision of upstream services and attention in exchange of bequest. On the 
other hand, there is actually a controversial debate concerning incomplete contracts, with the 
need for a formal theory of bounded rationality (Tirole 1999). Thus, the possibility that family 
contracts are not necessarily complete is left for future research. This issue of incentives within 
the family is further discussed in an altruistic setting by Becker (1991), Lindbeck and Weibull 
(1988), and Bruce and Waldman (1990). 
14. This result also holds in the model of intergenerational exchange transfers without home- 
sharing, proposed by Cox (1987) and Cox and Rank (1992), where the marginal cost of the 
child's time-related transfer equalizes the marginal utility of services for the parent. 
15. The probability that the child chooses the co-residence state is given by Pr(90 0) = F(0). 16. The same effect may be positive in the exchange model developed by Cox (1987) and Cox and 
Rank (1992). As we consider a rise in the child's income, the parent has to pay a higher price to 
receive the same level of attention from his child, but he also buys a lower amount of services. 
The relationship between the child's income and the financial transfer eceived is more likely to 
be positive. 
17. Under altruism, the difference between the transfer derivatives with respect to parent's and 
child's incomes should equal unity. This prediction is rejected according to the data both in the 
United States and in France. 
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18. Dunn and Phillips (1998) show that the deed to a parent's residence and to other parental 
property is more likely to be passed to a co-resident child than to a non co-resident child. 
19. Parents have the incentives to penalize teenage childbearing of their older daughters to avoid 
teenage childbearing decisions of their younger daughters when the daughters do not know the 
parental preferences with certainty. Hence parents treat their daughters differently according to 
their birth order so as to establish a reputation for preventing teenage childbearing, and they 
influence the children's behaviour through their choices of intergenerational transfers: the 
probability that a daughter with a teen birth will receive financial and co-residence support 
from parents decreases according to the number of daughters remaining at risk. 
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